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INSURANCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-"Newly Acquired 
Automobile" Clause Extended To Cover 
Previously Owned Inoperable Vehicles-
National Indem. Co. v. Giampapa* 
Plaintiff insurance company brought an action for a declaratory 
judgment that it be held not liable on a policy it had issued to the 
insured motorist. A party injured in an accident involving the 
insured had obtained a judgment against the insured in a suit which 
the insurer defended with a reservation of rights. Although a 1949 
Cadillac was the "Described Automobile" in the insurance policy, 
the insured was driving a 1956 Ford at the time of the accident. The 
trial court found that during the term of the policy the Cadillac had 
become inoperable1 and was replaced by the Ford which the 
insured had owned before the insurance policy was issued. Although 
the Ford had not previously been operable, it was put in working 
order when the Cadillac could no longer be used. The insured con-
tended that when the 1956 Ford replaced the Cadillac, it became 
automatically covered under the policy's "Newly Acquired Auto-
mobile" clause,2 since the insurance policy specifically stated that 
notice of a substitution need not be given to the insurer.3 The 
action of the insurance company was dismissed. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Washington, held, affirmed, three judges dissent-
ing. The 1956 Ford was covered by the "Newly Acquired Auto-
mobile" clause and the insurance company was liable on the policy. 
The dissenters argued that an automobile is not "newly ac-
quired" within the meaning of the insurance policy unless it is 
purchased subsequent to the issuance of the policy. The dissent 
• 399 P.2d 81 (Vvash. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
I. The term "operable" refers to whether an automobile is capable of being used 
on the road, i.e. in "working condition." Lynam v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 
218 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Del. 1963), aff d, 331 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1964); Brown v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (car without 
an engine held inoperable); Maryland Indem. &: Fire Ins. Exch. v. Steers, 221 Md. 
380, 388, 157 A.2d 803, 808 (Ct. App. 1960). Similarly, a car is inoperable while under-
going repairs. Royer v. Shawnee Mut. Ins. Co., 91 Ohio Ct. App. 356, 359, 106 N.E.2d 
784, 786 (1950). Of course, while an automobile is used by someone, it is operable. 
Yenowine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1965) (used by 
insured's son). 
2. The relevant parts of the clause are: "(4) Newly Acquired Automobile-an 
automobile, ownership of which is acquired by the named insured or his spouse if a 
resident of the same household, if (i) it replaces an automobile owned by either and 
covered by his policy ••.. " Principal case at 83. The clause in the principal case, 
like all other such clauses extending automatic coverage, includes only damages re-
sulting from the operation of the vehicle, and not those resulting from fire or theft. 
See note 3 infra. 
3. The policy reads: "[B]ut such notice is not required under coverages A, B and 
division 1 of coverage C if the newly acquired automobile replaces an owned auto• 
mobile covered by this policy . • • ." Principal case at 83. The above coverages were 
for property damage and bodily injury. 
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accords with the great weight of authority4 which reasons that, since 
"newly" indicates "recently,"5 the parties only contemplated pur-
chases made after coverage ensued.6 The majority of courts have 
held that no other reasonable interpretation of the clause is possible, 
and in the absence of an ambiguity a court is not authorized to add 
or detract from the plain language of such clauses.7 
Despite an almost unbroken line of contrary decisions, it would 
appear that the approach of the principal case is in accord with 
public policy and with the true intent of the parties. The words 
"Newly Acquired," which the majority of courts have interpreted 
as precluding coverage of previously owned vehicles, appear only 
in the caption of clauses extending automatic coverage. 8 The clause 
merely requires that ownership be acquired-not acquired at a par-
ticular time-and that the vehicle replace the automobile described 
in the policy.9 Captions are not indicative of the intentions of the 
parties to a contract,10 since they are typically not a complete and 
accurate description of the contractual provisions they preface. 
Moreover, the majority found that the language was subject to 
more than one reasonable interpretation. The term "newly," when 
read in light of the whole clause, may have referred to the use of the 
vehicle replacing the "Described Automobile," rather than the ac-
quisition of ownership, and to "acquire" may have meant to bring 
into use a means of transportation not previously available. Under 
this approach, when one obtains title to an inoperable vehicle he 
would not be acquiring an automobile within the meaning of the 
policy, since the policy is only concerned with automobiles that can 
be driven. Finding that the clause is thus subject to these conflicting 
interpretations, the majority, applying the general rule of con-
struing documents against the drafters, ruled in the insured's favor.11 
4. E.g., Yenowine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1965); 
Lyman v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 383 (D. Del. 1963), affd, 331 
F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer, 250 N.C. 45, 
108 S.E.2d 49 (1959); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 340 S."W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1960); see 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 4293 (1962); 12 COUCH, IN-
SURANCE 2D § 45:193 (1964). See also Terbell, Developments in Standard Automobile 
Liability Coverage, 35 NEB, L. REv. 363, 370 (1956). 
5. Howe v. Cromley, Jones & Cromley Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 115, 119, 57 N.E.2d 
415, 418 (Ct. App. 1944). 
6. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1957). 
7. Fullilove v. United States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 240 La. 859, 125 So. 2d 389 (1960). 
One court, however, found the same language to be ambiguous and construed it to 
cover an automobile acquired in the interim between the filing of an application 
for insurance and the date upon which the policy became effective. Boston Ins. Co. v. 
Smith, 149 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
8. See note 2 supra. 
9. See note 2 supra. 
10. E.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Trenner, 35 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Dodson 
v. Newark Ins. Co., 143 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965). 
11. E.g., Conn v. Walling, 186 Kan. 242, 349 P .2d 925 (1960). This rule is particu-
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However, even absent an ambiguity, the decision in Gaunt v. 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,12 indicates that the inequity 
resulting from a literal reading of the terms of an insurance contract 
might justify a court's ignoring those terms and construing the pro--
visions in a manner consistent with the understanding of the in-
sured. The Gaunt court, while admitting that it might be doing vio-
lence to the language of the life insurance policy before it, felt 
compelled to interpret the policy as a layman would, in order to 
protect the insured. A concurring opinion, urging the court to take 
an additional step, stated that the court should not even attempt to 
interpret the language of the provision in dispute, for interpretation 
in a given case would only perpetuate uncertainty in insurance 
contracts.13 It further suggested that the court's decision should 
be based solely on the inequity which would result if the insured 
were not protected in his interpretation of the language of the 
disputed provision. Thus, in the principal case, if it were reasonable 
for the insured to consider the replacement automobile included 
under the automatic coverage clause, the court, on the basis of the 
above authority, would have been justified in reaching its decision 
regardless of whether an ambiguity existed. 
Public policy would also appear to favor the approach taken in 
the principal case. As mentioned above, an insured party might 
interpret the clause extending automatic coverage as including a 
previously owned but inoperable vehicle that replaced a "Described 
Automobile." He would, therefore, begin operating the replace-
ment car without notifying the insurer of the substitution. In the 
event of an accident, if the clause were construed against the in-
sured, not only would he be deprived of protection because he was 
misled by the clause, but, in addition, an injured person might be 
denied adequate compensation. Rather than subjecting these two 
parties, neither of whom was in a position to alter the terms of the 
insurance contract, to such consequences, public policy would seem-
ingly favor holding the insurance company liable. 
Extending insurance coverage as quickly as possible .would ap-
pear to be in the best interest of the insurer, the insured, and the 
public.14 From the standpoint of the insurer, the automatic exten-
Iarly appropriate in the case of insurance policies where the insured has little or no 
power to alter the terms of the policy. 
12. 160 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). The case involved a 
suit by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The main issue was whether the 
policy was effective upon completion of the medical examination or upon acceptance 
of the policy by the company. The court held that although the language would 
seem to say that the policy must first be accepted by the insurance company, the 
insured should be protected in his reasonable reliance since the medical examination 
had been passed and a premium had been paid. 
13. 160 F.2d at 603. 
14. See Home Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Rose, 150 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1945); Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. Toney, 178 Va. 196, 16 S.E.2d 340 (1941). 
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sion of coverage eliminates the need for the insured to change the 
policy when replacing the "Described Automobile," and therefore 
removes an opportunity to change insurance companies.15 The 
insured would be afforded immediate financial protection. Finally, a 
person injured in an accident involving the replacement automobile 
who had a valid claim for recovery would also be assured of com-
pensation since the insurer would be liable from the moment that 
the vehicle comes into use. Recognizing this community of interests, 
the insurance companies have extended automatic coverage to cars 
purchased after issuance of a policy. The same factors that prompt 
an insurance company to extend such coverage to a newly pur-
chased automobile, however, are equally applicable to the situation 
in the principal case. There is a similar need for the immediate 
protection of the insured and the public, and the risk of liability to 
the insurer is not increased,16 for in both cases there would be only 
one vehicle in operation at any given time. In the principal case, for 
example, the previously owned automobile (Ford) was inoperable 
until it replaced the "Described Automobile" (Cadillac), and there-
after the "Described Automobile" was not used. The opportunity 
for fraud does not appear to be any greater in this situation than 
when the second vehicle has been purchased after the issuance of the 
policy. In both cases the burden would be upon the insured to show 
that two automobiles were not being used simultaneously, although 
the nature of the insured's proof would be different. When the 
insured owned both cars before the issuance of the policy, he would 
have to show that the vehicle which was not described in the policy 
was inoperable until it replaced the "Described Automobile," and 
that thereafter the "Described Automobile" was not used.17 The 
condition of the replacement car is unimportant, because any car 
15. This advantage to the insurance company was recognized in Quaderer v. In-
tegrity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Minn. 383, 388, 116 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1962). 
16. Boston Ins. Co. v. Smith, 149 So. 2d 68, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1963). 
17. There are other possibilities involving replacement which might arise. The 
first is where the previously owned automobile, not described in the policy, was in 
working order but not used until the described automobile became inoperable. Here 
it would seem that the previously owned automobile should not be covered for the 
possibilities of fraud on the insurance company would be too great. The insurance 
companies would be offered no protection against simultaneous operation of both 
cars and, in effect, both would be covered. However, a simple test to determine 
whether coverage should be extended would be licensing. That is, if the previously 
owned car were licensed before replacement, insurance should not be extended, while 
if the replacement automobile were not licensed, there would seem to be no reason 
for denying coverage. Second, there is the possibility that the insured might replace 
the described automobile with one he already owned, but which had been previously 
insured by another company. Should the insured choose to adopt this course of action 
and cancel the policy originally covering the substitute vehicle, there would seem 
to be no reason for not extending coverage to this car under the automatic renewal 
clause; only one car would be covered at any given time, and there would be scant 
opportunity for fraud, for the existence of previous insurance coverage of the re-
placement automobile could be easily determined. 
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purchased as a substitute after the issuance of the policy would 
unquestionably be covered.18 Indeed, if the insured had sold his 
1956 Ford, and, after obtaining the policy, repurchased the car 
as a substitute for the Cadillac, the Ford would have been covered.19 
If, however, insurance companies believe that the interpretation 
of the principal case provides too great an opportunity for fraud, 
they can apply to the insurance commissioner for permission either 
to eliminate the "Newly Acquired Automobile" clause, or to re-
quire notice of a substitution before coverage is extended. 
In the interests of equity, the insured's reasonable interpretation 
of the terms of his insurance policy should be accepted, and in the 
interest of society, those injured in automobile accidents should be 
assured of adequate compensation. In the principal case, the court 
protected both interests without placing undue, or even increased, 
burdens upon the insurer. 
18. See, e.g., Yenowine v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 
1965). 
19. See Hardt v. Travelers Fire Sur. Co., 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 109 (C.P. 1955). 
